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Indonesia, the fourth most populous nation in the world and the largest economy in 
South East Asia, has an unusual economic and industrial history, with its post-1945 
independent history dominated by three major episodes. Through to the mid-1960s, it 
had barely commenced the process of modern industrialization. It lagged behind its 
Asian neighbours, experiencing neither the state-orchestrated heavy industrialization of 
China and India, nor the export-oriented growth then getting under way in the Asian 
newly industrialized economies. Its modern industrial sector, such as it was, was 
dominated by a few large state-owned enterprises, which in most cases had been 
established by Dutch commercial interests before the Pacific War, and subsequently 
taken over by the state as part of the 1957–58 nationalizations.  
Then, in a sudden reversal of fortunes, the country began to experience very rapid 
industrialization from the late 1960s, with the manufacturing sector growing at more 
than 10 per cent per annum for most of the subsequent three decades. Initially this 
growth was import-substituting in nature, but from the mid-1980s a successful transition 
to export-orientated industrialization was engineered. That rapid growth was brought to 
an abrupt halt in 1997–98 with the Asian financial crisis, which resulted in a peak-to-
trough growth collapse of more than 20 percentage points. Subsequently, growth 
recovered, but the effects on the nature and drivers of industrial growth appear to be 
profound. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analytical narrative and interpretation of 
Indonesia’s industrialization outcomes and policies, and to draw attention to the general 
lessons for late industrializers. The country’s industrial experience is of general interest 
not only because of its size but also the lessons from its unusual history, particularly its 
pronounced episodes in development, its management of natural resource abundance, 
the continuing ambivalence towards globalization, adjustment to large external shocks, 
and major political and institutional transitions. These episodes of economic 
development and industrial policies also provide insights into how firms develop and 
respond to major events. The effects of the deep crisis of 1997–98, for example, can be 
examined with reference to an unusually rich firm level panel dataset. The dramatic 
events of this crisis and its aftermath, presaging major institutional changes, have also 
altered the country’s industrial growth dynamics. 
We organize the paper as follows: Section 2 provides a brief analytical narrative of 
Indonesian economic development, highlighting its generally strong economic 
performance since the late 1960s, in the context of pronounced variations in economic 
outcomes, policy environments, and external circumstances. In Section 3 we discuss the 
key features of its industrialization record, including rapid growth, structural change, the 
switch to export orientation in the 1980s, and its unusual ownership features. Section 4 
examines how major economic crises impact on the industrial sector, with special 
reference to firm level impacts and responses in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. 
Section 5 investigates the phenomenon of ‘jobless industrialization’ during the period 
since 1998. The finally section sums up and assesses some broader implications from 




2  Indonesian economic development  
The focus of this paper is industrialization, but it is important to understand the broader 
economic history context. By the mid-1960s, Indonesia was an economic basket case. 
Inflation was out of control, and the left-leaning government had withdrawn from most 
international organizations, preferring instead to be part of the Beijing–Pyongyang–
Hanoi–Phnom Penh–Jakarta axis of ‘new economic forces’. Rudimentary national 
accounts estimates suggest that the country’s per capita income was about three-quarters 
of that half a century earlier (van der Eng 2002). The standard development economics 
textbook of the time, authored by one of the leading foreign authorities on the country, 
portrayed Indonesia as a ‘chronic economic dropout’ (Higgins 1968). Then, in one of 
the most remarkable reversals of fortune in recent economic history, the regime change 
in 1966 ushered in a period of rapid economic growth, with per capita income 
approximately quadrupling over the next three decades (Figure 1). This growth was 
largely fuelled by the adoption of broadly orthodox policies, including the restoration of 
macroeconomic stability, more open trade and investment policies, encouragement of 
the private sector, and investments in infrastructure and education. The 1970s oil boom, 
large overseas aid flows, the vigorous implementation of the green revolution and rural 
development more generally, and strong synergies with the then emerging regional 
superpower, Japan, greatly facilitated this rapid economic growth (Hill 2000). 
Indonesia’s rapid growth came to a sudden and unanticipated halt in 1997, with the 
Asian financial crisis. Its economic contraction in 1998, of over 13 per cent, was the 
sharpest among the four crisis-affected East Asian economies, and one of the most 
severe in the modern era. The formal banking sector imploded and the currency fell to 
less than one-fifth its pre-crisis value. Moreover, the country experienced ‘twin crises’, 
in the sense that the economic crisis was accompanied by, and indeed precipitated, by 
regime collapse, resulting in the departure of President Soeharto in May 1998 after 32 
years of authoritarian rule, and ushering in a period of political instability. Its territorial 
integrity was for a period threatened, and there were very serious ethnic and social 
disputes. From 1998 to 2004, there were five presidents, and there was a major 
reworking of its political institutions. As a result, the once stable and predictable 
commercial environment became much less certain. Nevertheless, and contrary to 
widespread expectations at the time, given the magnitude of the 1998 growth collapse, 
Indonesia recovered moderately fast, following the pattern of its East Asian neighbours. 
Its per capita income and most social indicators recovered to pre-crisis levels by around 
2004. 
Reflecting these developments, Indonesia also has an unusual macroeconomic history, 
experiencing two episodes of hyper-inflation (Figure 2). The most serious was in the 
mid-1960s, when inflation peaked at over 1,000 per cent. In 1998, a shorter episode saw 
inflation reach almost 100 per cent. Both events were associated with regime change, 
and had their origins in the loss of fiscal discipline, in turn caused by deep political 
instability. However, for the rest of the recent history, macroeconomic policy has been 
more prudent, with fiscal deficits rarely exceeding 3 per cent of GDP and inflation, 
while typically above that of the country’s major trading partners, has been in single 
digits apart from the 1970s resource booms. Exchange rate movements have largely 
reflected these inflation outcomes, in addition to the special case of the 1997–98 capital 
flight that triggered the exchange rate collapse, and periods of high commodity prices 
that have resulted in a stronger nominal or real exchange rate.  
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Since the impact of and response to the crisis are a significant part of our story, it is 
useful to provide a brief narrative of the major institutional and political economy 
changes that occurred in response to the crisis (Hill and Shiraishi 2007). There were 
seven in total. First, in contrast to the Soeharto era, there is now a weakened (though 
now directly elected) presidency, subject to a variety of checks and balances. Second, 
cabinet unity is significantly weakened, with a ‘rainbow coalition’ of disparate voices 
and interests. Third, the legislature has become much more powerful, in contrast to the 
Soeharto era when it was essentially a rubber stamp for all government legislation. In 
the new arrangements, the president’s party is in the minority, and members of 
parliament need to be persuaded or bought off. Fourth, civil society has become much 
more active. Long suppressed under Soeharto, think tanks have proliferated, a free press 
has flourished, and street protests are common and occasionally influential. Fifth, the 
role of the bureaucracy has changed; it is no longer an arm of the president, accountable 
directly to him, and subject to few pressures from the parliament and civil society. A 
sixth feature is that the historically underdeveloped legal system now formally has 
greatly enhanced independent power and authority, but not yet the capacity or resources 
to undertake its commercial law responsibilities. Finally, a major decentralization 
programme was introduced in January 2001, shifting substantial power and resources 
from the central government to the second level districts. 
As we will argue below, these changes have profound implications for economic policy 
settings, for the conduct of economic policy, and for institutional development more 
generally. We provide illustrations below on how they have affected the pattern of 
industrialization since the late 1990s.  
3  Indonesian industrialization: a broad overview 
Turning now to the industrialization story, four key features characterize outcomes and 
the policy environment (Hill 1997). First, after decades of stagnation, Indonesia began 
to experience very rapid industrialization following the major political change and 
economic reforms of 1966–67. Annual industrial growth was at least 9 per cent in all 
but two of the 27 years, 1970–96 (Figure 3). Initially, catch-up and import substitution 
were the principal drivers. There was a decade of oil-driven growth, and the beginnings 
of a brief and costly heavy industry strategy. From the mid-1980s, labour-intensive 
exports became a significant engine of growth. This growth came to an abrupt halt with 
the crisis of 1997–98. The contraction in the manufacturing sector was about the same 
as for the economy as a whole of 13 per cent. Thereafter, positive growth has been 
recorded from 1999, but at lower rates than pre-crisis. For reasons we discuss below, the 
Asian financial crisis appears to have been a turning point for the industrial sector, with 
its growth falling below the economy-wide average for the first time since the 1960s. As 
a result of this rapid growth, from 1965 to 1997 the share of the manufacturing sector in 
GDP more than trebled (Figure 3). Since the crisis, the share of manufacturing has 
tended to decline slightly, triggering fears of a premature ‘deindustrialization’.  
Second, within manufacturing, structural change has been equally rapid (Table 1). Since 
the 1970s, there has been a shift towards a more diversified industrial structure, away 
from the earlier dominance of simple consumer goods and resource processing. The 
major labour-intensive and footloose industries grew rapidly during the switch towards 
export orientation in the mid-1980s. Textiles, garments, and footwear were the major  
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drivers of this export growth. Wood products expanded fast in response to the 
prohibition on the export of unprocessed timber, before encountering environmental 
constraints in the 1990s. Heavy industry grew quickly through to the mid-1980s in 
response to protection and major state investments. Within machinery and equipment, 
the automotive industry grew rapidly under the impetus of prohibitive protection for 
most of the Soeharto period, but collapsed in 1998–99. Electronics has become 
increasingly important and export-oriented, but never as prominent as in neighbouring 
East Asian economies. 
Third, Indonesia became a significant industrial exporter from the mid-1980s (Figure 4). 
In retrospect, the 1980s were a crucial period in Indonesian economic history. At the 
beginning of the decade, as oil prices first tapered off and then fell sharply, the country 
was highly exposed to the international oil market. Oil, gas, and related minerals 
provided about two-thirds of government revenue and almost three-quarters of 
merchandise exports. Indonesia could well have followed other major developing OPEC 
members—notably Mexico and Nigeria—into a debt crisis.1 Instead, the decline in oil 
prices triggered a major reassessment of trade and industry policy. The political 
economy pendulum swung in favour of the technocrats and their supporters who 
advocated a more liberal economic agenda, including reduced protection, a more open 
posture towards foreign investment, and simplified export procedures (Basri and Hill 
2004).  
Initially, manufactured exports were concentrated in resource-based activities, 
especially plywood, reflecting the country’s natural resource endowments and the 
prohibition of unprocessed commodities (Table 2). Its industrial export base began to 
widen significantly as the reforms took hold, with textiles, garments, footwear, 
electronics, furniture, sporting goods, and toys also registering rapid growth. The share 
of labour-intensive products in total manufactured exports increased in the wake of the 
1980s reforms, from about 45 per cent in the mid-1980s to 61 per cent by 1996. These 
reforms ‘worked’ in the sense that there was the strong and immediate export response 
observed above. Indonesia grew quickly out of the early 1980s recession and, although 
external debt rose sharply in the mid-1980s, debt/GDP ratios remained comfortable and 
began declining at the end of the decade. The reforms were also good for equity, as 
employment expanded significantly in the new export-oriented factories on Java. For 
the first time in its history, Indonesia became ‘East Asian’ in the sense of emerging as a 
major industrial exporter. Since around 1990, export performance has been more erratic. 
Growth began to slow in the early 1990s as a result of increased competition in export 
markets, a slackening in the reform momentum, slower productivity growth, and the 
real Rupiah appreciation. In the post-crisis era, export growth has also generally slowed, 
around an increasingly volatile trend, for reasons to be discussed shortly.  
A fourth feature is the country’s ownership patterns, which are unusual in some 
respects. Reliable estimates are now dated, and relate to the pre-1997 period, but are 
still broadly indicative of the patterns. There are high levels of ownership concentration, 
                                                 
1   See Gelb and Associates (1988) for a comparative assessment of the management of the 1970s oil 
boom in selected developing countries. Indonesia emerges as the country which most effectively 
recycled its windfall oil boom revenues, and which adjusted most quickly to the downturn in prices.  
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both in the sense of corporate conglomeration and seller concentration. Claessens, 
Djankov, and Lang (2000) have documented the former, finding that Indonesia 
exhibited the highest level of corporate concentration in East Asia in 1996, with the top 
ten families owning 57.7 per cent of listed corporate assets, but many were short-lived 
operations reflecting their rent-seeking origins.2 In terms of plant level industrial 
concentration, Bird (1999) found high levels of concentration, typical of those in 
relatively small, late-industrializing economies. Over the period 1975–93, concentration 
levels were declining steadily, though in the latter year the simple average 4-firm 
concentration ratio was still 54 per cent. Concentration ratios were significantly lower 
once allowance is made for imports.  
Indonesia’s industrial ownership patterns reflect the interplay of history, policy, and 
industrial organization factors (Table 3). In the mid-1960s, no foreign capital was 
present, and the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy were in state hands. The state-
owned enterprises (SOE) sector continued to be important throughout the Soeharto era. 
The oil boom period financed a major expansion in the SOE sector, initially in heavy 
industry, and later in several costly high-tech projects. Meanwhile, foreign investment 
returned to the country from the late 1960s in response to the newly liberal policy 
regime and generous fiscal incentives. As is the case in most countries, domestic firms 
are the major players in Indonesian industry, accounting for more than 50 per cent of 
manufacturing value added in most 2-digit industries. Among domestic firms, SOEs are 
important in certain ‘strategic’ industries, such as fertilizer, steel, and cement, together 
with some firms that were inherited from the pre-1966 nationalizations (e.g., sugar 
processing) and never subsequently relinquished. During the Asian financial crisis, the 
SOE sector in general contracted, especially in the case of the prestige projects, which 
were heavily dependent on direct government support. Foreign ownership has risen 
steadily since the economy was opened up in the late 1960s. The share of these firms in 
non-oil manufacturing value added rose from about 23 per cent in 1975 to 37 per cent in 
2005 (Table 3). The share rose higher still in the wake of the crisis, in response to policy 
liberalizations and the opportunity for foreign firms to buy distressed local assets. 
Moreover, as we will document below, foreign firms have been better able to endure the 
crisis. As is evident in the 2-digit ownership data, and consistent with industrial 
organization theory, multi-national enterprises are important in the international 
standard industrial classification (ISIC) 38, dominated by electronics and the 
automotive industry. They are also important in basic metals (principally steel and 
related products), the chemical industries, and a few labour-intensive activities (textiles, 
garments, footwear, and miscellaneous manufactures) where knowledge of export 
markets is important. 
 
4  Economic crises: firm level impacts and responses3 
                                                 
2  That is, in terms of the shares of its leading conglomerates in output and capitalization. Note, 
however, that the mid-1990s data were dominated by Soeharto-linked conglomerates that have since 
been largely dismantled, and thus the figure would be lower now.  
3  This section draws on Aswicahyono, Hill, and Narjoko (2010).  
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We referred above to the general impacts of the 1997–98 economic crisis, including the 
deep but short-lived growth collapse, the general slowdown in the manufacturing sector, 
and indifferent export performance. In this and the following section, we examine first 
in more detail the firm level impacts and second, the employment effects. 
A feature of rapid industrialization and well-functioning product and factor markets is 
high levels of firm mobility across size groups. In an earlier study of Indonesian 
industrialisation (Aswicahyono, Bird, and Hill 1996), we found there was considerable 
evidence of this mobility, in particular of firms ‘graduating’ to larger size groups. We 
were able to examine this phenomenon through very detailed firm level analysis, made 
possible by the fact that each firm in the annual survey is identified by a consistently 
designated code that enables it to be traced over time. One of the results of this earlier 
analysis was to demonstrate that the widely discussed phenomenon that the share of 
small firms in industrial output was apparently declining, could actually be interpreted 
positively, not as a sign that these firms were being pushed out in the process of the 
rapid industrialization—the commonly held perception at the time—but rather that they 
were vacating the smaller size groups and graduating to larger groupings. This result 
was shown by comparing the share of total output by firm-size at the ‘current year’, the 
basis for the gloomy conclusion, and the ‘initial year’, the basis for the positive 
interpretation. 
In this paper, we repeat the exercise through to the year 2005. That is, we trace through 
each firm over the period 1990–2005, and assign it to a firm-size grouping. These are 
chosen arbitrarily but plausibly as firms with 20–99 workers, 100–499 workers, and 
more than 500 workers.4 We then estimated output (and employment, though not shown 
here) by the three size groups, based on each firm’s size in the current year and the 
initial year, with the latter being either 1990 or the year the firm commenced operation. 
The results are presented in Table 4. There is little change in the size share based on 
current size, with the share of small firms rising slightly pre-crisis, then falling 
somewhat, while the largest firms were most affected by the economic crisis. However, 
based on size in the initial year, the small firm share rose quite quickly through to the 
crisis, but then began to decline from 2001. 
Thus the crisis and its immediate aftermath appear to have marked a turning point in 
this process of firm mobility. Until the crisis, smaller firms continued to display the 
dynamism evident in the pre-crisis period. However, after the crisis, the pace of 
graduation slowed, and the small firm share in both series declined. These results are 
not necessarily cause for concern, as they could simply reflect a longer-term process of 
industrial consolidation. They may also reflect the effects of the crisis, from which 
smaller firms experienced greater adjustment difficulties, or the increased competitive 
pressures that occurred as firms sought to survive.  
There are no general data to support the latter proposition. But there is presumptive 
evidence to advance the hypothesis that the barriers for smaller firms increasing their 
scale have risen since the crisis, particularly in access to finance. This arises due to the 
                                                 
4  That is, approximately corresponding to small, medium and large firms respectively. Experimentation 
with different size groups revealed that the general conclusions are not sensitive to the definition of 
size groups.  
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credit rationing devices that are commonly put in place after crises, which invariably 
support larger firms with better collateral and credit histories (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). 
The underlying argument is that banks have more difficulty differentiating between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ loan applicants after the crisis and, as a result, banks are more likely to 
adopt more stringent lending policies, favouring those who were able to provide more 
collateral and/or an established credit history. There is some evidence from East Asia in 
the late 1990s supporting this view. As Gosh and Gosh (1999) and Ding, Domac, and 
Ferri (1998) have argued, not only was there credit rationing during the crisis, but also 
small and medium-sized firms were more adversely affected than larger ones. 
Indonesia’s banking sector was the most severely affected among the East Asian crisis 
economies, resulting in a significant renationalization of banks and reform of the 
regulatory regime. However, as Rosengard et al. (2007) note, these reforms have had 
the unintended consequence of limiting the access of small enterprises to formal sector 
financial institutions. Based on the questionable premise that larger financial institutions 
are less likely to fail than smaller ones, the country’s small, community-based 
institutions have been instructed to merge with larger, centralized units, and among the 
latter ‘… innovative microfinance services were viewed with suspicion and hostility’. 
(ibid.: 87)  
Transition matrices of the size distribution of firms support the conclusion that the 
speed of firm mobility slowed after the crisis. These matrices are computed for the pre- 
and post-crisis periods, defined here as 1992–96 and 2001–04 (Table 5). They show the 
distribution of firms for the same three size groups according to the initial and final year 
of each sub-period. Thus, of the small firms in 1992, by 1996 90.6 per cent were still 
small, while 8.8 per cent and 0.6 per cent had graduated to the medium and large groups 
respectively. A clear result over the two sub-periods is that there is less mobility: more 
small firms remained small after the crisis as compared to before it. A similar 
conclusion holds for the medium-sized firms. 
We can further extend the analysis of firm level dynamics by examining two additional 
aspects: the patterns of firm level entry and exit, and the rates of expansion and 
contraction for ‘surviving’ firms. Here, too, we undertake this analysis by tracking the 
history of each firm enumerated in the survey. An earlier study by Narjoko (2006) 
examined these patterns in the pre-crisis and crisis periods. This analysis extends the 
examination through to 2004, by which time manufacturing output had returned to pre-
crisis levels and was growing moderately strongly. Specifically, we examine two 
interrelated phenomena: the entry and exit rates of firms over time and, among the 
survivors, expansion and contraction rates. 
First, with respect to entry and exit rates, the analysis can be conducted with reference 
to number of plants, employment, or value added. The story is broadly similar, and so 
we present results only for the rates by number of firms.5 The following definitions are 
used for entry and exit rates, for industry j and time periods t and t-1 
                                                 


























t j NEP ,  = total number of plants that enter industry j between t and t-1, 
t j NXP ,  = total number of plants that exit industry j between t and t-1, 
1 , − t j NTP  = total number of plants in industry j in t-1. 
We identify four separate sub-periods: pre-crisis (1993–96), crisis (1996–99), early 
post-crisis (1999–2002), and return to growth (2002–04). Before the crisis, as would be 
expected, there were high plant-entry rates, and these were almost double the exit rates 
(Figure 5). Note also, however, and consistent with industrial dynamism, that the exit 
rates were not insignificant. As the crisis hit, entry rates fell to approximately half the 
pre-crisis figure, while exit rates rose and began to exceed entry rates. These trends 
applied to practically all industry groups, but especially to textiles, clothing, and 
footwear, wood products, and non-metallic minerals (respectively ISIC 32, 33, 36). 
They also apply to most firm and ownership groups, though with considerable 
variations (see Narjoko (2006) and for a summary Narjoko and Hill (2007). 
While this response is as would be expected, some trends are puzzling. In particular, the 
immediate crisis response of exit rates exceeding entry rates has persisted through to 
2004, by which time positive economic growth had resumed for four years. Moreover, 
entry rates have continued to decline, in contrast to what might have been the expected 
outcome of a sharp decline during the crisis and recovery thereafter. At least two 
possible conjectures are plausible here. One is that there is a delayed response of firms: 
the initial adjustment is to reduce output, switch output composition, extend credit lines, 
live off past capital and so on, in the hope that firms can trade through the difficulties. 
Especially for well-established firms, such strategies can endure for several years. 
Hence, the exit rates are spread out over several years, as illustrated in Figure 5, rather 
than a single large reduction in the crisis period. The second conjecture relates to the 
extended decline in entry rates, for five years after the crisis. Here the likely explanation 
is that potential new entrants were holding back, observing the continuing exit process, 
in addition to the fact that there were high levels of excess capacity following the crisis. 
The difficulties in accessing finance and rising competitive pressures, as noted above, 
have arguably resulted in increased barriers to entry. 
What happened to firms that survived the crisis? We follow the usual definitions of 
expansion and contraction rates (see for example Davis, Haltiwanger, and Shuh 1996), 





























, _ jt EMPL POS = total employment of plants that expanded between t 
and t-1, 
, _ jt EMPL NEG = total employment for plants that contracted between t 
and t-1, 
, _ jt EMPL T  = total employment in year t. 
Here, too, as would be expected, expansion rates exceeded contraction rates prior to the 
crisis (Figure 6). During the crisis, expansion rates declined, but contraction rates 
increased and the two rates converged. Thereafter, the pre-crisis pattern of expansion 
exceeding contraction resumed, although the gap between the two narrowed, that is, the 
net expansion rate was lower. There are also differences among major industry groups, 
with a similar division as for the entry and exit rates. In particular, growth has 
originated more from the expansion of existing plants than the entry of new ones in the 
resource-based and capital-intensive industries, such as food products and processing, 
paper products, chemicals, and machinery and equipment (respectively ISIC 31, 34, 35, 
and 38). 
The picture for firm dynamics can be summarized by decomposing employment growth 
into that due to entry/exit on the one hand and expansion/contraction on the other. We 
conduct the analysis with reference to employment effects rather than plants, and thus 
the terms are referred to as ‘entry rate 2’ and ‘exit rate 2’ to differentiate them from 




























, _ jt EMPL EN  = total employment of plants that entered industry j 
between t and t-1, 
, _ jt EMPL EX  = total employment of plants that exited industry j 




   
employment growth decomposition j,t = entry rate 2 j,t + expansion rate j,t   
                   +exit rate 2 j,t + contraction rate j,t  
Figure 7 presents the results of the decomposition. The results show that, since the 
crisis, expansion has become more important than entry for employment over time. The 
inference is therefore that, in the wake of the crisis, most of the growth originated from 
what may be termed ‘insiders’ that is firms who were able to survive the crisis, and 
adapt more quickly to the significantly altered policy and commercial environment. As 
Narjoko (2006) demonstrates for the period through to 2000, specific firm attributes 
were commonly associated with these outcomes, in particular prior export orientation 
and foreign ownership. In addition, firms that maintained credit lines or had low debt 
generally survived and were able to respond more quickly to the economic recovery 
from 2000. Potential new entrants were apparently deterred by real or perceived barriers 
to entry, including the more unpredictable business and political environment, and a 
much more cautious financial sector.  
5 Jobless  industrialization?6 
At the same time as firm mobility and dynamics appeared to have declined, output 
growth since the crisis has become considerably less employment-elastic, resulting in 
the formerly major engine of Indonesian employment growth becoming much less 
significant. To probe this relationship, we undertake three sets of calculations: the 
relationship between output and employment growth in Indonesia by sector before and 
after the Asian financial crisis, the Indonesian employment manufacturing record in 
comparative Asian perspective, and Indonesia’s industrial employment dynamics 
among the major firm-size groups.7 
We commence with the observation that employment growth is the outcome of a simple 
identity, that is, it is the product of output growth and the elasticity of employment 
growth with respect to output growth. Hence, 
ΔN = ΔY(ΔN/ΔY) 
To understand employment growth, the left-side variable in the equation, we therefore 
need data on the two right-side variables. Our analysis commences with the aggregate 
picture for the major sectors in Indonesia, pre- and post-crisis, followed by a 
comparison of the industrial sectors for Indonesia and several neighbouring economies. 
Since we are focusing on longer-term trends, and the crisis years were so atypical, we 
present data for two sub-periods, 1990–96, corresponding to the later years of the long 
Asian boom, and 2000–08, by which time the immediate crisis impacts had been 
                                                 
6  This section draws on Aswicahyono, Hill, and Narjoko (2011). 
7  In the paper on which this section draws, we also present estimates of employment-output and 
employment-wage elasticities. These results generally confirm those from the more aggregated 
sectoral estimates.  
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resolved and economic growth had resumed, but before the global financial crisis had 
any major impact. 
Table 6 shows output and employment growth for the two periods, together with the 
implied output elasticities.8 We also present for each sector the differences between the 
two periods for the three series, and the rankings of these differences.  
Aggregate output growth was considerably slower in the second period, at about two-
thirds of that in 1990–96. However, the slowdown was not uniform across sectors. In 
fact, the data point to major changes in the drivers of Indonesian economic dynamism 
pre- and post-crisis. Two sectors actually grew faster: agriculture, reflecting generally 
buoyant commodity prices and competitive exchange rates, and transport and 
telecommunications, driven by technological changes and substantial deregulations.  
By contrast, there was a major slowdown in three sectors, mining and utilities, 
manufacturing, and construction, with growth rates in the second period less than half 
those of the first. The explanations for these outcomes are both sector-specific and 
economy-wide. Construction growth pre-crisis was at unsustainable levels, and it was 
hard hit by the crisis. Growth since then has been subdued, owing in part to financing 
constraints and reduced public sector investments. The latter factors also explain slower 
utilities growth, while mining growth has been slow as a result of the uncertain 
exploration and taxation environment, and notwithstanding historically high commodity 
prices. 
The slowdown in manufacturing growth, from well above the economy-wide average to 
just below it, is the most puzzling result. As a tradable goods sector, like agriculture, it 
benefited from the competitive boost of a depreciating exchange rate in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis. Moreover, the sector faced no significant demand-side constraints 
until the recent global financial crisis. Global manufacturing growth was rapid, there 
was a continuous relocation of the industry to developing economies, and unlike 
agriculture there have been no major external trade barriers.  
The picture is similarly varied for employment growth, except that the slowdown was 
less pronounced as compared to output. That is, employment growth in the second 
period was about three-quarters of that in the first, and this in a context where aggregate 
labour supply is anyway gradually beginning to decline. Here too there is considerable 
variation across sectors. The two major differences are the turnaround in agriculture, to 
slightly positive growth compared to the earlier contraction, and the collapse in 
manufacturing growth. Employment in all the other sectors grew more slowly, in some 
cases by a significant margin. Some of these outcomes reflect a continuation of 
significant labour-saving technological changes, such as the major transformation in 
trade patterns, from traditional petty trade to modern malls and retail outlets, in addition 
to the ubiquitous mobile telecommunications revolution, and the rapid growth of civil 
aviation and motorized land transport.  
                                                 
8  Henceforth for convenience we will refer to output employment elasticities as ‘output elasticities’ and 
employment-wage elasticities as ‘wage elasticities’.  
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The bottom panel presents the implied output elasticities. These indicate whether the 
slowdown in non-agricultural employment is due mainly to slower output growth or less 
employment-elastic output growth. The aggregate picture is that output elasticity rose 
slightly. However, the increase is almost entirely due to the change in agriculture, from 
labour-shedding to slightly positive growth. With the exception of mining and utilities, 
which employ few workers, and a slight increase in construction, the general picture is 
less elastic employment growth. In particular, the elasticities fell sharply for three major 
employers of labour—manufacturing, trade, and transport and communications. The 
explanation in the case of the latter two is clear: there was a major change in the 
technology with which the service was provided, that is, owing to the proliferation of 
modern shopping malls, rapidly expanding civil aviation and so on. Even in a low-wage 
economy like Indonesia, all these activities are much more capital-intensive than the 
services they replaced. However, there was no such exogenous labour-displacing 
technology sweeping through manufacturing. The explanation for the declining output-
employment elasticities in manufacturing therefore has to lie elsewhere, in the 
commercial environment and factors affecting the willingness of employers to hire 
labour.  
To sum up on the Indonesian employment picture, growth in aggregate was marginally 
slower after the crisis. But this conceals major sectoral differences. Agriculture returned 
to positive growth, reflecting Indonesia’s diverse natural resource advantages in the 
context of high commodity prices. Construction employment growth fell sharply, but 
this was entirely due to lower output growth. Employment growth slowed significantly 
in some of the service sectors experiencing rapid technological change, even though 
output growth was strong. Manufacturing is unique in that it is the only major sector to 
experience more than a halving in both its output growth and its output elasticity.  
It is useful to compare these results to outcomes in neighbouring developing economies, 
to ascertain whether any of these trends are evident. Here also we conduct the analysis 
for the pre- and post-crisis periods, with respect to output and employment growth, and 
the implied elasticities. Table 7 presents the results. 
In the pre-crisis period, the pace of Indonesian industrialization was similar to its 
rapidly industrializing neighbours, Malaysia and Thailand, and much faster than Korea 
and the Philippines. Industrial growth in the three South East Asian growth 
economies—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand—slowed sharply after the crisis, most 
of all in Malaysia and the least in Thailand. The Philippine growth rate accelerated 
slightly, from a weak base, while Korean growth slowed somewhat. Thus from a growth 
perspective, Indonesia is well within South East Asian norms. 
The employment picture is also broadly similar. The three South East Asian economies 
experienced a very sharp growth slowdown. Malaysian manufacturing employment 
actually shrunk, reflecting the fact that this higher wage economy has been 
progressively shedding its labour-intensive segments. Employment growth in Thailand 
was slightly stronger, but the absolute growth decline was sharper than in Indonesia. 
Korean and Philippine employment growth was anaemic throughout, contracting in the 
former case since 2000. Thus, here also Indonesia does not emerge as a regional outlier. 
The output elasticities declined significantly in all five economies. As noted, they turned 
negative for Korea and Malaysia. The rates of decline are broadly similar for Indonesia,  
 
13
the Philippines, and Thailand. In fact, although Thailand’s output elasticity remains the 
highest of the five, the rate of decline in Indonesia is the lowest among the South East 
Asian sample. 
To sum up so far, on the basis of the aggregated sectoral data, Indonesia has 
experienced a pronounced slowdown in industrial employment growth since the Asian 
financial crisis. Manufacturing was the only sector to experience both a marked 
deceleration in output growth and a major decline in output elasticity. This therefore 
suggests that there were sector-specific factors at work in the country’s industrial labour 
market. However, in comparative East Asian terms, the Indonesian industrial record is 
not an outlier. Other fast-industrializing middle-income developing countries registered 
similar declines in both output growth and output elasticities. Among the four 
comparators, the Thai experience is arguably the most relevant. Korea has clearly 
moved out of the labour-intensive phase of industrialization, while Malaysia is in 
transition. In both cases, very low or even negative employment-output elasticities are 
not surprising. Growth in the Philippines has been slower throughout. The widespread 
presumption in Indonesia is that the tightening of the labour market regulations since 
2000 is the principal explanation for the sharp drop in its output elasticity. Yet, although 
Thailand’s output and employment growth remain somewhat higher, its output elasticity 
has fallen just as fast. This is in spite of the fact that the Thai labour market is not as 
heavily regulated as Indonesia’s, and has not been subject to the regulatory tightening 
since the Asian financial crisis. In other words, there appear to be more general factors 
at work affecting the patterns of South East Asian industrialization and employment, in 
addition to labour market policies.  
We now turn to the more disaggregated Indonesian industrial census data to shed light 
on these issues. Indonesia has two main industrial statistics series, the annual survey of 
establishments with at least 20 employees, known as Statistik Industri (SI), and the 
decennial economic census of all industrial establishments (Sensus Ekonomi, henceforth 
SE). We present results from the SE series which, although conducted only once every 
decade, are more comprehensive in scope, covering all firms with at least five 
employees, as compared to the SI cut-off of 20 employees. The SE data are probably 
also more reliable, since it is a census and therefore there was a more concerted attempt 
to collect data for all firms. 
The SEs were conducted in 1986, 1996 and 2006. These periods thus neatly coincide 
with major sub-periods. That is, 1986–96 was the decade of reform and rapid growth, 
while 1996–2006 encompasses the crisis and return to slower growth. To investigate the 
impacts across firms of different size, we classify establishments into three (arbitrary) 
groups, ‘large’ (100+ employees), ‘medium’ (20–99), and ‘small’ (5–19). Alternative 
size classifications do not affect the results. The disaggregation by size is relevant to our 
paper since we conjecture that scale may influence firm responses to economic events 
and regulations. For example, smaller firms may be more resilient to adverse economic 
shocks, and they may fall outside the regulatory net. We examine the industrial statistics 
at the 2-digit ISIC level of industrial classification. We further combine the industries 
into a broader factor intensity grouping, ‘labour-intensive’ (ISIC 32, 33, 39), ‘resource- 
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based’ (ISIC 31, 34, 35), and ‘capital-intensive’ (ISIC 36-38), since industries within 
these groupings share some similar characteristics and response patterns.9 
The raw data on manufacturing employment are revealing. Table 8 summarizes the 
results for the three SE by size groups. Employment grew quite rapidly over the whole 
period 1986–2006, by 7.3 per cent per annum. However, there was a marked slowdown 
between the two sub-periods, with growth declining from 10.1 per cent in the first 
decade to just 4.6 per cent in the second. There were also some significant 
compositional shifts. In both 1986 and 1996, the large firms accounted for just over half 
of the employment, whereas by 2006 the small firms had become the dominant 
employer. The medium firm share declined throughout the period. Employment in both 
the large and small firms grew rapidly in the first decade, by 10.3 per cent and 11.4 per 
cent respectively. But from 1996 to 2006, large firm employment barely increased, at 
just 1 per cent per annum, whereas small firm employment continued to expand quickly, 
by 8.8 per cent. Medium firm employment growth also declined, but not to the same 
extent as the large firms.10 
Thus there has clearly been a sharp slowdown in Indonesia’s industrial employment 
growth since the Asian financial crisis, especially compared to the ‘reform decade’, 
1986–96. This has occurred because of the slower industrial growth, and most 
particularly because of the much lower output-employment elasticity. Among the 
sectors, manufacturing is unusual in this respect, in that there has been both slower 
output growth and lower employment elasticity. This growth slowdown appears to have 
occurred across all major manufacturing sectors. There have also been significant 
compositional shifts since the Asian financial crises, with almost all of the industrial 
employment growth coming from small firms. Firms in the ‘factory sector’, with 20 
plus workers, seem to have virtually stopped hiring over this period. 
Linking these conclusions back to the discussion in Section 2 of the paper, the 
explanation for these outcomes is broadly as follows. In the intermediate aftermath of 
the crisis, there was a major boost to competitiveness from the rapidly depreciating 
nominal exchange rate. But this did not translate into employment growth since much of 
the formal sector of the economy was incapacitated by corporate debt workouts, the 
exodus of foreign investors, and the freezing up of financial markets. Also, regulatory 
and policy uncertainty increased in the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, 
and the major decentralization initiative of 2001. The latter especially affected access to 
                                                 
9  The labour-intensive industries are textiles, garments, and footwear, wood products and furniture, and 
miscellaneous manufactures. The resource-based are food and related products, paper products, and 
chemical, rubber and plastic products. The capital-intensive group includes non-metallic minerals, 
steel products, and metal and machine goods, electronics and automobiles. More elaborate 
classifications could be employed, but they are unlikely to affect our results significantly. If Indonesia 
were a major participant in global electronics production networks (which it is not), then strictly 
speaking the components assembly industry should be classified as labour-intensive. 
10   One caveat to be attached to these results is that the employment data are all ‘head count’ estimates. 
We do not have data on the intensity of work, that is hours worked, by firm-size. While the estimates 
for L and M firms are likely to closely resemble some ‘full time equivalent’ employment figure, that 
for the S firms could well be lower, owing to seasonality factors and more variable output and work 
patterns. Hence, it is possible, but not certain, that the rising S share is an overstatement.  
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natural resources, on which several Indonesian manufacturing activities depend. 
Intensified labour market regulations and infrastructure constraints emerged as serious 
problems after 2000. From about 2003, rising commodity prices and the return of 
foreign capital began to put pressure on the exchange rate, with a significant real 
appreciation commencing around 2005. By then, all the earlier competitiveness 
advantages from the exchange rate depreciation had been eroded. These events occurred 
in the context of intensified international competition, particularly from China, but also 
other lower wage competitors, notably Vietnam. 
These factors operated as economy-wide influences, in addition to sector-specific 
effects. For example, tighter labour market regulations had an adverse effect on the 
traditional labour-intensive sectors, textiles, clothing and footwear, in addition to the 
breakdown in the formerly effective operation of the import drawback facility for 
export-oriented firms. The more cumbersome export-import procedures and a less 
inviting foreign investment regime meant that Indonesia has been a relatively minor 
participant in the rapidly expanding global production networks centred on 
‘fragmentation trade’. Natural resource based activities were affected by interruptions to 
reliable raw material supplies. 
Does this slower manufacturing employment growth matter? The answer to this 
question depends on the explanation for the slower growth. It is of concern to the extent 
that a major link in the transmission mechanism from growth to poverty alleviation has 
been weakened. That is, fewer Indonesian workers are now drawn into the relatively 
better paid jobs in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, most of the industrial jobs now 
being created are in small firms, where employment conditions are generally inferior to 
those of the larger units, especially to the extent that smaller firms are able to evade 
labour protection measures. As argued above, the much slower job employment growth 
is principally the result of Indonesia’s declining international competitiveness, 
underlining again the crucial link between macro level economic reform and poverty 
alleviation. 
Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the problems, for at least three reasons. 
First, the Indonesian record is not that different from its neighbours, including the 
traditionally dynamic Thai economy where intensified labour market regulation has not 
occurred. This suggests that the changes observed in this paper are part of a generalized 
regional phenomenon, in which rising competition from China and the demise of very 
labour-intensive segments are important factors explaining slower employment growth.   
Second, we have shown that more jobs are being created in other sectors. The fastest 
growth has occurred in several service sectors, reflecting technological advancement, 
deregulation, and at the margin the switch to non-tradables as a result of the 
appreciating real exchange rate since around 2003. Agriculture has reversed the earlier 
decline, reflecting buoyant commodity prices, and reminding us of Indonesia’s 
resource-based economic diversity. It is an overstatement to assert, as some have, that 
Indonesia is experiencing premature deindustrialization, but there is certainly an 
industrial deceleration evident, and it seems to have become a permanent feature of 
Indonesia. Is this structural shift in employment patterns a cause for concern? ‘Industrial 
fundamentalists’ would assert that it is, on the grounds that there are greater 
externalities associated with industrialization, such as inter-industry linkage creation  
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and skill formation. But such views are of dubious validity, as shown by the existence 
of many high-income service and resource-based economies in the world. 
6  Summing up and lessons 
Indonesia’s industrialization experience is of interest for a number of reasons. It has 
industrialized rapidly since the late 1960s. There have been pronounced episodes in its 
industrialization outcomes and policy orientation. It managed the transition from 
import-substituting to export-oriented industrialization quite successfully. It has had to 
navigate through a series of large external shocks, some positive (such as rising 
commodity prices for its abundant natural resource endowments) and others negative 
(downside terms of trade movements and economic crises). Analysis of these various 
events is greatly facilitated by its good industrial statistical base, including firm level 
data over time. 
Two major turning points are clearly evident in its industrial history. The first is a 
straightforward story of a dramatic change in policy direction in the mid-1960s, 
ushering in the mostly rapid industrial growth over the past four decades. This is a 
conventional episode of a well-managed policy reform producing the dividend of rapid 
socio-economic development, including a significant industrial transformation. 
The second turning point, of 1997–98, is a more complex story. The economy in 
aggregate recovered quite quickly from the exceptionally severe economic crisis. But 
the effects on industry have been mixed. Although manufacturing output growth has 
recovered, the industrial dynamics have been altered quite profoundly. Growth has been 
slower than the economy-wide average, and manufacturing is no longer the leading 
growth engine it was prior to the crisis. Manufacturing employment growth has also 
slowed appreciably, and in the formal manufacturing sector it is now anaemic. Firm 
dynamism also appears to have declined significantly. 
The general implication from our analysis is that the fortunes of the manufacturing 
sector are closely linked to those of the economy as a whole, and in turn to the 
macroeconomic policy environment. Industry policy may matter—although in 
Indonesia it has generally been ineffective—but the exchange rate, monetary policy, the 
state of infrastructure, openness to trade and investment, education outcomes, and 
labour market regulations are much more important. Moreover, it is not obvious that the 
changing relative fortunes of the country’s manufacturing sector are cause for concern, 
except to the extent that the root cause may be a problem of competitiveness related to 
excessive regulatory policies and under-investment in key supply-side inputs. But these 
are also economy-wide issues, and they need to be addressed through economy-wide, 
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Table 1: The changing structure of manufacturing output 
(% of value added, firms with 20+ workers) 
   1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000  2005  2009
Food,  beverage,  and  tobacco  44.4 38.2 32.6 23.0 22.3 21.2 24.7 25.3 
Textile, leather products and footwear  10.7  13.3  14.0  19.7  17.8  16.1  11.9  12.6 
Wood  and  wood  products  2.4 5.7 8.7  12.1  8.2 5.4 3.9 2.3 
Paper  and  printing  4.7 4.0 3.8 4.7 4.8 6.3 7.7 6.8 
Fertilizers,  chemicals,  and  rubber  22.4 18.0 16.0 12.8 13.1 14.8 17.2 20.5 
Cement  and  non-metallic  mineral  2.6 4.2 5.0 3.8 3.6 3.5 5.1 5.0 
Iron  and  basic  steel  0.7 3.1 7.2 8.0 7.5 3.6 2.7 3.4 
Transport equipment machinery, and 
t
12.1 13.4 12.5 15.5 21.9 27.0 24.8 21.9 
Other  manufacturing  products  0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 2.1 1.9 2.2 
Source: computed from unpublished data from Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Board of Statistics, 
Indonesia, Statistik Industri. 
 
Table 2: Manufactured exports by factor-intensity, 1980–2009 
   1980  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005  2009
Unskilled labour-Intensive   170.9  663.3 4201.4 10573.3 13429.4 13786.8 14945.9
34.2  32.5  46.5  46.1 38.1 34.3 32.0 
Resource-based, labour-intensive 77.0 957.2 3083.6 4722.0 3413.6  2904.6  2043.0
15.4 46.8  34.1  20.6  9.7  7.2  4.4 
Resource-based, capital-intensive  115.4  241.8  997.9  2406.0  4749.4  5975.0  8516.2 
23.1  11.8  11.0  10.5 13.5 14.9 18.2 
Electronics    97.1  80.9 205.4 2944.3 9072.2 10050.2 9545.3
19.5  4.0 2.3 12.8 25.7 25.0 20.4 
Footloose capital-intensive  38.6  100.6 552.7 2311.2 4576.1  7448.0  11717.6
7.7  4.9 6.1 10.1 13.0 18.5 25.1 
Total    499.0 2043.8 9040.8 22956.8 35240.7 40164.6 46768.0 
   100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: the first row for each series refers to totals in US$ millions, while the second refers to its percentage 
share of the total 
Source: computed from unpublished data from Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Board of Statistics, 
Indonesia, Statistik Industri. 
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Table 3: Concentration and foreign ownership by sector, 1990–2005 
Concentration  (CR4)           
1990 1993 1996 1999  2002  2005 
            
31  Food, beverages, and tobacco  59  69  59  57  56  60 
32  Textile, clothes, and leather industry  29  32  28  29  30  42 
33  Wood and wood products  22  24  26  25  29  33 
34  Paper and paper products  61  57  61  70  73  64 
36 Non-metallic  mineral  products  61  59  59  63 66 66 
37  Basic metal industries  80  73  79  79  74  66 
38 
Fabricated metal, machinery, and 
equipment 74  75  74  67  69  71 
39 Other  manufacturing  industries  61  66  61  62 73 79 
1-ULI Unskilled,  labour-intensive  30  33  29  30  32  43 
2-RLI Resource-based,  labour-intensive  48  57  51  50  51  57 
3-RCI Resource-based,  capital-intensive  65  62  64  67  66  61 
4-ELE Electronics  74  68  68  57  55  67 
5-FCI Footloose  capital-intensive  73  78  78  75  72  72 
   Non-oil and gas manufacturing  54  56  56  54  57  58 
 
Foreign ownership (share, in %)                   
      1990  1993  1996 1999  2002  2005 
31  Food, beverages, and tobacco  8.5  9.7  14.0  15.8  9.4  24.9 
32  Textile, clothes and leather industry  17.8  21.8  29.3  37.4  32.1  32.8 
33  Wood and wood products  10.1  11.7  22.9  15.8  11.6  11.2 
34  Paper and paper products  30.2  14.9  33.8  23.5  46.4  29.0 
35  Chemicals and chemical products  33.1  36.6  43.0  44.8  29.7  26.3 
36 Non-metallic  mineral  products  18.0  23.3  33.4  34.6  28.3  35.9 
37  Basic metal industries  24.8  35.3  24.3  43.1  29.4  30.5 
38 
Fabricated metal, machinery, and 
equipment 46.1  36.4  42.4  58.0  67.6  68.3 
39 Other  manufacturing  industries  19.5  44.4  51.9  56.1  33.7  46.9 
1-ULI Unskilled  labour-intensive  16.2 21.1 27.3 35.4  28.8  30.0 
2-RLI  Resource-based,  labour-intensive  9.0  10.2  16.8  15.9 9.8 22.8 
3-RCI Resource-based,  capital-intensive  29.5 32.5 35.9  40.0  34.9  29.9 
4-ELE Electronics  41.7  43.0  48.7  82.4  71.5  68.9 
5-FCI Footloose  capital-intensive  47.2 34.7 39.5 44.0  66.0  68.1 
   Non-oil and gas manufacturing  21.9  23.4  30.9  35.5  33.5  37.2 
Source: computed from unpublished data from Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Board of Statistics, 
Indonesia, Statistik Industri.    
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Table 4: Manufacturing output by size group, 1990–2005 
Current size (% VA) 
   Small  Medium  Large 
   L=20–99  L=100–499  L=500+ 
1990 7  27  66 
1991 6  28  66 
1992 7  28  64 
1993 7  23  70 
1994 7  23  70 
1995 7  22  71 
1996 7  21  73 
1997 8  27  65 
1998 8  24  68 
1999 7  25  68 
2000 7  24  68 
2001 9  24  68 
2002 7  24  69 
2003 6  23  70 
2004 6  25  69 
2005 5  25  70 
 
Initial size (% VA)    
Small Medium  Large 
   L=20–99  L=100–499  L=500+ 
1990 7  27  66 
1991 7  28  65 
1992 10  31  59 
1993 10  31  58 
1994 11  29  60 
1995 13  29  59 
1996 12  31  57 
1997 14  38  48 
1998 14  32  54 
1999 12  33  54 
2000 13  31  56 
2001 15  31  54 
2002 13  31  56 
2003 13  31  56 
2004 13  32  55 
2005 12  33  55 
Source: computed from unpublished data from Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Board of Statistics, 
Indonesia, Statistik Industri.  
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Table 5: Transition matrices 
a. Distribution of plants (% total plants), 1992 and 1996 
      1996 






S=20–99 90.6  8.8  0.6 
M=100–
499 13.1  75.4  11.5 
L=500+ 1.9  13.1  85.1 
 
b. Distribution of plants (% total plants), 2001 and 2004 
      2004 






S=20–99 96.1  3.7  0.1 
M=100–
499 10.9  84.3  4.8 
L=500+ 0.9  11.8  87.3 
Source: computed from unpublished data from Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Board of Statistics, 
Indonesia, Statistik Industri. 
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Table 6: Indonesia: sectoral output and employment growth, 1990–2008 
   1990–96  2000–08  Change  Ranking 
GDP growth (%) 
Agriculture 3.1  3.9  0.8  2 
Mining and utilities  5.3  1.5  -3.8  5 
Manufacturing 11.2  5.2  -6  6 
Construction 13.7  6.5  -7.3  7 
Wholesale trade  8.9  5.8  -3  4 
Transport 8.2  10.1  1.9  1 
Other activities  6.4  5.8  -0.7  3 
Total 7.9  5.3  -2.6 
        
Employment growth (%) 
Agriculture -1.7  0.2  1.9  1 
Mining and utilities  6  3.7  -2.3  3 
Manufacturing 6  0.9  -5  5 
Construction 10.8  5.7  -5.1  6 
Wholesale trade  6.5  1.7  -4.8  4 
Transport 9.4  3.9  -5.5  7 
Other activities  4.6  3.6  -1  2 
Total 2.3  1.7  -0.6 
       
Implied output elasticities 
Agriculture -0.56  0.05  0.6  2 
Mining and utilities  1.14  2.56  1.4  1 
Manufacturing 0.53  0.18  -0.4  5 
Construction 0.78  0.88  0.1  3 
Wholesale trade  0.74  0.3  -0.4  6 
Transport 1.14  0.38  -0.8  7 
Other activities  0.71  0.62  -0.1  4 
Total 0.29  0.32 
Source: ADB statistical database system (https://sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/index.jsp). 
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Table 7: East Asian manufacturing output and employment growth, 1988–2008 
   1988–96  2000–08  Change  Reverse ranking 
GDP growth (%) 
Indonesia 11.3 4.7 -6.5  2 
Malaysia 13.9  4.3  -9.7  1 
Philippines 3  4.2 1.2  5 
Thailand 11.2  6  -5.1  3 
Korea 7.5  6.3  -1.2  4 
      
Employment growth (%) 
Indonesia 7.6  0.9  -6.7  3 
Malaysia 8.6  -1.4  -10  1 
Philippines 2.4  0.7  -1.7  4 
Thailand 9.9  2  -7.9  2 
Korea 0.2  -1  -1.1 5 
      
Implied output elasticities 
Indonesia 0.67  0.2  -0.47  4 
Malaysia 0.62  -0.32  -0.94  1 
Philippines  0.78 0.17 -0.62  2 
Thailand  0.88 0.33 -0.55  3 
Korea 0.02 -0.16  -0.18  5 
Source: ADB statistical database system (https://sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/index.jsp). 
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Table 8: Indonesian manufacturing employment by firm size, 1986, 1996, and 2006 
Total ('000)  Large  Medium  Small  Total 
1986 1,331  345  770  2,446 
1996 3,545  609  2,273  6,427 
2006 3,921  823  5,297  10,041 
        
Composition (% of total) 
1986 54  14  32  100 
1996 55  10  35  100 
2006 39  8  53  100 
        
Growth (annual average, %) 
1986–96 10  6  11  10 
1996–2006 1  3  9  5 
1986–2006 6  4  10  7 
Source: computed from unpublished data from Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Board of Statistics, 
Indonesia, Sensus Ekonomi (1986, 1996, and 2006). 
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Figure 1: GDP per capita and economic growth, 1960–2010 
 
 
Note: GDP per capita measured on the right axis, GDP growth on the left axis. 
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Figure 2: Inflation and the exchange rate, 1960–2009 
 
 
Note: inflation is measured on the left axis, exchange rate on the right axis. 
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Figure 3: Manufacturing growth and share of GDP, 1960–2009 
 
 
Note: manufacturing growth measured on the right axis, manufacturing share on the left axis. 





















1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)
Manufacturing, value added (annual % growth) 
 
29
Figure 4: Manufacturing export growth and share, 1980–2009 
 
 
Note: manufacturing growth measured on the left axis, manufacturing share on the right axis. 
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Figure 5: Entry and exit rates in manufacturing, 1993–2004 
 
 
Note: % based on number of plants. 
Source: computed from unpublished data from Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Board of Statistics, 
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Figure 6: Expansion and contraction rates in manufacturing, 1993–2004 
 
 
Note: % based on employment. 
Source: computed from unpublished data from Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Board of Statistics, 
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Figure 7: Decomposition of employment growth, 1993–2004 
 
 
Note: entry and exit rate in the figure are defined in terms of employment (i.e., entry rate 2 and exit rate 2, 
see text). 
Source: computed from unpublished data from Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Board of Statistics, 
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